兔子先生

兔子先生 金融系

一、议程

时间：2025/11/8（星期六）

场地：学院237（易方达会议室）

注：每篇论文共计50分钟（报告40分钟，自由讨论10分钟）

二、报告人及文章摘要

1. 陈彪

个人简介：陈彪，上海财经大学金融学博士，西南财经大学金融学院副教授，研究方向为公司金融理论和科技金融。在《经济研究》《管理科学学报》《数量经济技术经济研究》《中国管理科学》、Journal of Business Ethics和Energy Economics等国内外核心期刊发表论文20余篇，目前正在主持国家自然科学基金面上项目，主持完成国家自然科学基金青年项目和四川省自然科学基金青年项目。

题目：Inflation, Debt Overhang and Corporate Investment

摘要：We develop a model to examine the impact of inflation on corporate debt overhang and investment. Our model characterizes how inflation influences corporate investment decisions through two key assumptions: sticky cash flows and fixed nominal debt coupons. Expected inflation delays investment by reducing the real value of future cash flows and raising discount rates, though lower cash flow stickiness partially offsets this effect. More importantly, expected inflation mitigates debt overhang by lowering the real burden of corporate debt, thereby reducing agency costs between shareholders and creditors, and encouraging firms to invest earlier. This phenomenon is more pronounced when corporate debt has a longer maturity. We test these predictions using a sample of U.S. firms and present new evidence that supports our theory.

2. 牛英杰

个人简介：牛英杰，经济学博士，上海财经大学金融学院助理教授，研究领域主要为动态公司金融理论、模糊理论、绿色金融等。已在Journal of Economic Theory、Games and Economic Behavior、Economic Theory、Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control、《经济研究》《管理科学学报》等国内外权威期刊发表论文多篇。学术成果曾获第十八届中国金融工程学年会优秀论文二等奖、2020年当代经济学博士创新项目等，主持国家自然科学基金、教育部人文社科基金项目等课题。

题目：Consumption Dynamics under Ambiguous Volatility

摘要：We consider the optimal consumption-savings policies in a dynamic setting by incorporating ambiguity about volatility dynamics. The agent formulates robust decisions under the worst scenario. We show that (i) ambiguous volatility strengthens the savings motive and the agent responds to consume less, (ii) the additional precautionary savings demand matters substantially for MPCs and the model predictions about MPCs are consistent with empirical estimates, and (iii) comparison with alternative models characterizing ambiguity demonstrates the superiority of our model. Finally, we explore the influence of ambiguous income volatility on the retirement decision.

3. 谭英贤

个人简介：谭英贤，江西财经大学金融学院教授、博士生导师，中国准精算师，金融工程系主任，湖南大学金融学博士，上海财经大学金融学博士后，入选江西省赣鄱俊才支持计划，主要研究领域为绿色金融、气候金融、公司金融、资产定价与科技金融等。近三年聚焦绿色金融与可持续发展，探讨“双碳目标”下企业动态投融资与绿色低碳转型研究。近年来在Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control、European Financial Management等国际权威SSCI期刊和《中国管理科学》《系统工程学报》等国内权威期刊发表学术论文20余篇，出版学术著作1部。主持国家自然科学基金研究课题2项，教育部人文社会科学研究课题2项、中国博士后科学基金一等资助项目、江西省自然科学基金面上项目、省社科规划项目等省部级课题10多项，参与国家自科基金面上项目等课题多项，参与国家一流本科课程一门。撰写多篇智库报告获国家部委、省政府领导肯定性批示和采纳。

题目：Corporate carbon emissions and liquidity management under green-transition risks

摘要：Liquidity is critical for long-term corporate green innovation investment. We develop a dynamic model of corporate carbon emissions and liquidity management for financially constrained high-carbon firms facing green transition risks, including internal green innovation failures and external environment policy shifts. Firms mitigate emissions through short-term abatement and long-term green innovation. While green innovation can reduce emissions and tax burdens, thereby increasing firm value, it necessitates higher precautionary cash holdings and delays dividend payouts. Firms with lower cash reserves consequently favor abatement over innovation, particularly those facing bankruptcy liquidation. Furthermore, policy transition risk reduces precautionary incentives, which partially discourages green innovation investment. Finally, introducing green innovation subsidies and threshold-based carbon tax policies strengthens precautionary incentives, increases the proportion of investment in green innovation, and accelerates corporate green transitions.

4. 吴文生

个人简介：吴文生，合肥工业大学经济学院金融工程系副教授、硕士生导师，主要从事资产定价、投资组合、公司金融等领域研究，目前在Journal of Banking and Finance、《系统理论工程与实践》《中国管理科学》等期刊发表论文10余篇，主持国家自科项目和省部级项目4项。

题目：Managing Government Debt and Taxes in the Age of Climate Change

摘要：In this study, we develop a model for managing government debt and taxes when facing climate risk. We find that the mitigation of climate risk significantly increases household value and a country’s debt capacity and lowers the marginal costs of servicing debt. Moreover, the government lowers the amount of mitigation spending because of the crowding-out effect of taxes. Finally, debt results in a greater willingness to pay for mitigation because mitigation technology can effectively lower the degree of default risk by reducing the degree of climate risk.

5. 赵思琦

个人简介：赵思琦，复旦大学经济学院讲师，主要研究领域为动态金融理论、绿色金融、金融摩擦。论文发表于《金融研究》《世界经济》、Economic Theory、Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization、Journal of Mathematical Economics、Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control等期刊。

题目：Managing Resilience against Climate Disaster with Sustainable Finance

摘要：We study how to build up resilience against climate disasters with sustainable finance. The adaptation benefits of green capital incentivize allocation to eco-friendly production, but external financing frictions hinder balance-sheet adjustment. The endogenous reallocation dynamics create both transition risk and positive externality from fire sales of carbon-intensive assets. Expanded credit supply improves resilience by smoothing balance-sheet adjustment, whereas easing equity constraints can weaken adaptation incentives and erode resilience. In equilibrium, the greenium reflects both reallocation and financing margin.

6. 邹镇涛

个人简介：邹镇涛，兔子先生 金融系副教授，博士生导师，研究领域为连续时间金融，近年研究成果发表于Journal of Economic Theory、Games and Economic Behavior、Economic Theory、Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control、Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization、Journal of Banking & Finance等重要学术期刊上。主持国家自然科学基金面上项目和青年项目各一项。

题目：Dynamic R&D Competition with Overlapping Ownership

摘要：We study the impact of overlapping ownership on the strategic investment and welfare of firms in a dynamic model of R&D competition. The existence of overlapping ownership induces the follower to invest later through the conventional anticompetitive effect, but the leader to invest earlier through the preemption-exacerbating effect. The former effect improves welfare, while the latter effect harms welfare. When technology uncertainty is low, the strategic equilibrium exhibits a sequential-investment pattern. As the anticompetitive effect dominates, overlapping ownership always improves the welfare of firms. By contrast, when technology uncertainty is high, the preemption incentive is mitigated, and a joint-investment pattern can be sustained. As overlapping ownership exacerbates the preemption incentive, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium may shift from a joint-investment pattern to a sequential-investment pattern. Therefore, overlapping ownership may harm the welfare of firms when the R&D projects have high technology uncertainty.